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PROVISIONS FOR FOREIGN CONVICTIONS IN HABITUAL:
CRIMINAL LEGISLATION
One of the most difficult problems arising in those states
which have multiple offense statutes is to determine the effect
to be given convictions obtained in foreign states. Obviously some
criterion is necessary in determining which foreign convictions
are acceptable as a basis for multiple offense convictions. In some
states, foreign convictions have been accorded exactly the same
effect as local convictions.1 This attempt at the solution of the
problem will be termed for convenience the external view. On
the other hand, in a number of states, it is not sufficient that the
offense has been declared by a foreign jurisdiction to be of the
degree of seriousness cognizable under the local multiple offense
law. 2 The gravity of the offense must be weighed in the light of
local policy. This approach may be termed the limited internal

view.8
THE EXTERNAL VIEW

A majority of the states base their habitual criminal legislation on the external view.4 However, the legislatures differ with
1. Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) § 5281; Cal. Stat. (1935) 1699, c. 602; Conn.
Gen. Stat. (1930) § 6501; Ga. Code (1933) § 27-2511; Idaho Code Ann. (1932)
§ 19-2414; I1. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 38, § 602; Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1933) § 9-2207; Iowa Code (1935) §§ 13396, 13397, 13400; Kan. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1933) c. 21-107a; Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1930) §
1130; Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 279, § 25; Mo. Stat. Ann. (1932) § 4462; Neb.
Comp. Stat. (1929) § 29-2217; N.H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 396, § 1; N.C. Code
Ann. (Michie, 1935) § 4202; N.D. Sess. Laws (1927) c. 126, § 1, as cited in
State v. Malusky, 59 N.D. 501, 230 N.W. 735 (1930); Ohio Crim. Code (Patterson, 1924) § 13741; Tex. Ann. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1925) arts. 61-64; Utah
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) § 103-1-18; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1930) § 5054; Wash.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 2286; W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1932)
§ 6130.
2. Arts. 709-713, La. Code Crim. Proc. of 1928; Ariz. Rev. Code Ann.
(Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4899; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) §§ 17338-17340; Minn.
Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 10157; Mont. Rev. Codes (1921) § 11595; N.Y. Penal Law
(1938) §§ 1941-1943; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1936) tit. 21, § 54.
Under the New York Act, a prior conviction in a federal court of transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce (which could not be a
felony under state law) was clearly insufficient to punish as a second offender
a defendant who was later convicted in New York of another crime. People
v. Sassone, 12 N.Y.S. (2d) 473 (1939). The attitude of the New York courts
toward their Habitual Criminal Act was adequately expressed in People v.
Gutterson, 244 N.Y. 243, 250, 155 N.E. 113, 115 (1926), where the court in
refusing to allow a federal conviction of using the mails to defraud as the
basis for a conviction as a second offender, stated: "The Legislature has
fixed a standard which can reasonably include only crimes which are punishable under the laws of this state. Doubtless other reasonable standards might
be used which would include the crime of using the mails to defraud. The
Legislature has not seen fit to apply such standards."
3. A strict internal view would exclude all foreign convictions. Obviously
no effect would be given foreign convictions.
4. See note 1, supra.
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respect to the offenses which shall be embraced within these
statutes. In some jurisdictions the scope of such laws is very restricted. For example, in North Carolina 5 additional punishment
is prescribed only for the second offense of manslaughter. The
Alabama! and Texas' statutes are also narrow in scope. In the
former state, it is requisite that both convictions be for two identical crimes. In Texas the offense must be at least of the same
nature.
In other jurisdictions, the statutes may be regarded as comprehensive with respect to the offenses included. The Indiana
habitual criminal statute provides that the person must have
been ".

.

. twice convicted, sentenced and imprisoned in some

penal institution for felony, whether committed heretofore or
hereafter, and whether committed in this state or elsewhere
within the limits of the United States of America. .

. ."8

The

Kentucky l

statutes make no mention of sentence
Kansas and
or imprisonment, it being sufficient in those states that there
shall have been a previous felony conviction "the punishment of
which is confinement in the penitentiary."'" The North Dakota
law provides that "if a person commits a felony, within this State,
after having been convicted of two felonies, whether in this State
or any other State of the United States,' 1 2 he shall be punished
as a multiple- offender. However, this statute by its terms does
not apply to "offenses made felonies by statute not involving
moral turpitude." It is very doubtful that this latter provision is
of any consequence. In interpreting it, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota held that violations of liquor laws are felonies
involving moral turpitude.' In this connection the following
statement in the concurring opinion of Burr, J., is significant:
"Hence, it is clear from these holdings that where a man
has been sentenced upon a conviction for a felony

..

he is

5. N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935) § 4202.
6. Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) § 5281.
7. Tex. Ann. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1925) arts. 61-62.
8. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 9-2207. (Italics supplied.) In Kelly v.
State, 204 Ind. 612, 624, 185 N.E. 453, 458 (1933), the court said: "We construe the statute to mean that, when the charge is based upon crimes committed in other jurisdictions, it is sufficient to prove that the conviction was
for an offense 'which may be punished with death or imprisonment in the
state prison' in the jurisdiction where the conviction was had."
9. Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1933) § 21-107a.
10. Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1930) § 1130.
11. See notes 9 and 10, supra. Idaho requires only a conviction of a
Code Ann. (1932) § 19-2414.
previous
felony.
12. N.D.
Sess.Idaho
Laws (1927) c. 126, § 1, as cited in State v. Malusky, 59
N.D. 501, 503-504, 230 N.W. 735, .736 (1930).
18. State v. Malusky, 59 N.D. 501. 230 N.W. 735. (1930).
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by that very fact shown to have committed a crime involving
'14
moral turpitude.
In determining which crimes are sufficiently serious to warrant recognition under multiple offense laws, most states adopting
the external view have not been satisfied to proceed on the vague
distinction between felony and misdemeanor. 15 They have preferred to test the crime in terms of the type of punishment involved.1"
THE LIITED INTERNAL VIEW

It has been indicated previously that some states in administering their multiple offense laws are not willing to accept
without reservation convictions of offenses denounced by other
jurisdictions. 17 This limited internal view presents its own peculiar problems. The difficulty arises in determining the basis of
14. 59 N.D. at 521, 230 N.W. at 744.
15. See Hall, Theft, Law and Society (1935) 300-301, for a discussion of
the difficulty of classifying crimes into felonies and misdemeanors.
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 2286, is a hybrid statute. It
retains the term "felony" but also lists petit larceny and any other crimes
"of which fraud or intent to defraud is an element."
A number of other states have "enumerative" statutes and avoid the
distinction between felony and misdemeanors. Cal. Stat. (1935) 1699, c. 602;
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 10157; N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935) § 4202.
Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 38, § 602, provides: "That
whenever any person having been convicted of either of the crimes of burglary, grand larceny, horse-stealing, robbery, forgery, or counterfeiting,
shall thereafter be convicted of any one of such crimes, committed after
such first conviction, the punishment shall be imprisonment in the penitentiary..
" This statute is unique in that it was passed in 1883 (Ill. Laws
1883, p. 76, § 1) and has not been amended though constantly applied by
the courts.
16. Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp. 1933) c. 21-107a, Ky. Stat. Ann.
(Carroll, 1930) § 1130, and Mo. Stat. Ann. (1932) § 4462 are applicable to
any person convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. Ga. Code (1933) § 27-2511, Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1930) § 5054, and
W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1932) § 6130 determine whether the defendant
has been previously sentenced to the penitentiary for any offense. Conn. Gen.
Stat. (1930) § 6501 is closely analagous in that it requires actual commitment
in a state prison. A number of states require commitment to prison for a
certain length of time: Iowa Code (1935) §§ 13396, 13397, 13400 (three years);
Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 279, § 25 (three years); Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929)
§ 29-2217 (one year); N.H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 396, § 1 (three years); Utah
Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) § 103-1-18 (three years).
The term of punishment under the Wisconsin Habitual Criminal Act
varies, depending upon whether the previous offense was punished by fine,
sentence to imprisonment in the county jail, or sentence to imprisonment
in the state penitentiary. Wis. Stat. (1935) H§ 359.12, 359.13, 359.14.
Although the trend has not been as pronounced among the states adhering to the limited internal view, a number of jurisdictions have avoided
basing their multiple offense statutes on the distinction between felony and
misdemeanor. Ariz. Rev. Code Ann. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4899; Mont. Rev.
Codes (1921) § 11595; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1936) tit. 21, § 54.
17. See note 2, supra.
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elimination. The offense must be one which is regarded as a felony
in the local forum. Illustrative of this is Article 709 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure 18 which provides:
"Any persons who, after having been convicted, within
this State, of a felony or of an attempt to commit a felony,
or who, after having been convicted under the laws of any
other state, government, or country, of a crime which, if committed within this State, would be a felony, commits any
felony, within this State, upon conviction of such second
offense, shall be punished ... "19
When the statutes denouncing the offenses are couched in
identical language in both the state of conviction and the local
forum, the legislative provision above is relatively simple to
apply. However, this is not always the case. Statutes tend to vary
increasingly both in language and scope as the classification of
crimes becomes more and more complex. Offenses which previously were condemned singly are often combined and denounced under comprehensive statutes which ignore old
distinctions and technicalities. For example, the crime of theft
as defined in the Dominion Criminal Code includes inter alia
the common law crimes of larceny, attempts to commit larceny,
and embezzlement. 0 Thus an indictment under this statute may
or may not be for a felony (as that term is commonly employed),
depending on the facts under which the conviction was based.
It follows that a court of another jurisdiction when. presented
with a conviction of "theft" as a basis for invoking the multiple
offense statute faces a difficult task. The certificate of conviction
throws little light on the existence or non-existence of felony.
Three alternatives are available. The court could refuse to recognize the offense because the certificate does not show on its face
a prior conviction of felony. No jurisdiction has adopted this
extreme view. It remains for the court to determine whether or
not the certificate should be accorded the effect of showing prima
18. See also Arts. 710-711, La. Code Crim. Proc. of 1928.
19. Prior to the enactment of Arts. 709-711, La. Code Crim. Proc. of 1928
[La. Act 15 of 1928], the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted Section 974
of the Revised Statutes of 1870, which provided for a severe penalty upon
conviction for second or third offense, to mean second or third violation of
the same statutes. State v. Bailey, 165 La. 341, 115 So. 613 (1928).
In interpreting Act 15 of 1928, the court in State v. Brown, 185 La. 855,
171 So. 55 (1936), held that the name of the foreign offense is unimportant
as long as the elements of that offense constitute a Louisiana felony.
20. Art. 347, Dominion Criminal Code, as cited in State v. O'Day, 191
La. 380, 185 So. 290 (1938). Cf. Tex. Ann. Pen. Code (Vernon, 1925) art. 1410.
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facie a previous conviction of felony. In such situations the allocation of the burden to State or defendant is extremely important.
Particularly is this true where defendant has pleaded guilty to
the offense in question. The Louisiana and New York courts appear to be in conflict on the procedure to be adopted. In Louisiana
the view prevails that the State must satisfy the court that a
felony by local law was committed. 2 1 Since the hearing on the
information is in the nature of a criminal proceeding it is incumbent on the State to present positive proof of every essential
without resort to presumption. In New York 'the contrary view
prevails, at least where the foreign conviction is based on a plea
of guilty. 22 The attitude of the New York courts is that the plea
of guilty to a composite offense amounts to pleas of guilty to
each of the several offenses contained therein.
It may be desirable that no definite rule be established for
the allocation of the burden of proof. Each case seems to present
a separate problem, the solution of which requires a careful consideration of the particular statutes involved. A difference in
degree may very well result in a different conclusion. If the
scopes of the foreign and local statutes are almost identical, it
would seem unfair to place on the State the burden of disproving
the bare possibility that the foreign conviction was not for an
offense which could be considered a felony under local law. On
the other hand, if there is considerable divergence between the
statutes, it should be incumbent on the State to show that a local
felony has been committed; otherwise, the State does not satisfactorily prove its case. However, the complications resulting
from such an unorthodox approach to the problem may outweigh
21. In State v. O'Day, 191 La. 380, 185 So. 290 (1938), the court held that
the defendant who had previously been convicted in Canada of "stealing an
automobile" was improperly convicted as a third offender in absence of any
proof of asportation (which was not essential to the crime under Canadian
law), since that proof was necessary to establish that the act committed
by defendant in Canada would have amounted to a felony if committed
in Louisiana. The Louisiana Supreme Court pointed out that, as the Canadian
record revealed only a plea of guilty to an indictment for "stealing an
automobile," the state could not satisfy its burden of proof.
22. In People v. Dacey, 166 Misc. 827, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 156 (1938), a defendant on trial as a second offender set up as a defense that there was a
possibility that a previous Massachusetts conviction for larceny was not
based on an offense which would have been a felony in New York. The court
laid down as a test: "Was he [defendant] convicted of a crime, which, if
committed in this state, would be a felony, not what it could have been by
any possibility." (3 N.Y.S. (2d) at 163). The Massachusetts larceny statute
combined several offenses and included one which was not a felony in New
York, namely, obtaining property by falsely representing a future fact. The
burden was placed on defendant to prove that the conduct for which he
was convicted in Massachusetts did not constitute a New York felony.
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the doubtful advantage of giving full effect to local policy. An
attempt to administer statutes of the limited internal type
leads inevitably to such problems." The only solution is the
adoption of a statute of the external type.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of habitual criminal legislation is to remove
from society for extended periods those individuals who, because
of their past record, are deemed likely to commit additional
crimes in the future. An analysis of the external and limited
internal views in the light of this purpose serves to show that it
is far more effectively accomplished by the former approach.
This is apparent, for any person who consistently breaks the laws
of a foreign jurisdiction is likely to show a similar disregard for
the local laws.
It is submitted. that the Louisiana habitual criminal act
contains two undesirable features. First, the vague distinction
between felony and misdemeanor is an unsatisfactory basis for
determining the offenses to be included within the scope of the
statute. This difficulty would be avoided if the applicability of
the habitual criminal act were determined by the punishment
which the former conviction carries. Second, the problems inherent in legislation of the limited internal type must be faced
by Louisiana courts. Legislation based on the external view would
remedy this situation. Such differences as may exist between
local and foreign policy can adequately be adjusted through the
exercise of the discretion vested in the court to determine the
24
severity of the sentence to be imposed on the habitual criminal.
LYNDON

B.

ALLEN

23. For example, in Tennessee grand larceny is the taking and felonious
carrying away of property valued in excess of $60. Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) § 10921. Louisiana, however, requires that the value of the
property taken be $100 or over. Art. 1053, La. Code Crim. Proc. of 1928. In
an attempt by Louisiana to punish as a multiple offender a person who
previously plead guilty to grand larceny in Tennessee, would the burden of
proving that the amount involved was less than $100 be placed on the defendant?
24. Provisions for indeterminate sentences are contained in most habitual
criminal legislation. See the comparatively wide latitude allowed the court
by the Louisiana Act. Arts. 709-711, La. Code Crim. Proc. of 1928.

